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Wrong SIGN, NICE mess: is national guidance distorting
allocation of resources?
Richard Cookson, David McDaid, Alan Maynard
The Scots and the English and Welsh are producing
national guidance on NHS practice in different ways.
Two apparently competing national agencies have
already been established in Scotland—the Health
Technology Board for Scotland and the Scottish Inter›
collegiate Guidelines Network (SIGN). Yet another one
is in the pipeline—the Scottish Medicines Consortium.
In England and Wales there is one agency—the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE). Are
these national agencies contributing effectively to the
enhancement of performance in the NHS or are they
merely fuelling demand and distorting the processes
by which resources are prioritised?
Wrong SIGN
SIGN’s objective is “to improve the quality of health
care for patients in Scotland by reducing variation in
practice and outcome, through the development and
dissemination of national clinical guidelines contain›
ing recommendations for effective practice based on
current evidence.”1 SIGN has been reluctant to
consider resource issues,2 and economic considera›
tions have been limited to some “back of the envelope”
calculations about the budgetary impact of, for
example, antibiotic prophylaxis for surgery.3
This approach may help to reduce clinical error and,
at best, may help to reduce variations in practice for
recommendations that are easily affordable by local
NHS bodies. It does little to reduce variations for more
costly recommendations or to aid transparency in
allocation of resources. If SIGN does not take careful
account of cost, then local cash constrained NHS bodies
certainly will. Any costly recommendations issued by
SIGN will therefore be followed or ignored at a local
level largely on the basis of behind the scenes power
politics, free from public scrutiny and debate about what
alternative services could have been purchased.
The approach taken by SIGN does nothing at all to
increase efficiency in the allocation of resources. Being
efficient is not the same thing as being cheap. An inter›
vention may be relatively costly yet relatively efficient—
that is, it may do more good per pound spent than
other, relatively cheaper, interventions—and vice versa.
To improve efficiency decision makers need infor›
mation on what economists call opportunity costs—the
benefits foregone when scarce resources are used one
way rather than another. With this information,
efficiency can be improved by reallocating resources
towards relatively cost effective interventions and away
from less cost effective ones, thus delivering greater
health gains for the same level of spending. Of course
decision makers may be interested in the efficient
delivery of benefits other than health gains, taking
account of local circumstances such as budgetary
impact and wider political and ethical considerations.
In the absence of any information about opportunity
cost, however, they cannot attempt to achieve the
efficient use of resources.
These elementary economic principles have been
carefully and clearly set out in many introductory texts
on economic evaluation in health care.4 So either
SIGN’s protagonists believe that efficiency is an
irrelevant objective or they have failed to understand
the logic of resource allocation. Either way, SIGN is
inadequate because seemingly robust professional
advice is distributed to clinicians, which, if adopted, will
distort resource allocation and waste scarce resources.
SIGN’s rival or complementary organisation (why is
there such an overlap in such a small country?) is the
Health Technology Board for Scotland. This is charged
with “providing a single Scottish source of advice on the
clinical and cost›effectiveness of new and existing health
technologies.”5 The board is now over a year old, but it
has faced difficulties recruiting staff and seems fated to
contract out its work. Whether it does its work “in house”
or outside in academia or in commercial agencies, the
board is confronted by gross deficiencies in the supply of
well trained health service researchers and health
economists. Unfortunately, the board seems stymied at
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birth, while local politicians and policymakers are
increasingly impatient about the production of “results.”
There are plans to launch yet another agency in
Scotland later in 2001—a consortium of local area drug
and therapeutics committees (Health Technology
Board for Scotland, personal communication, 2001).
This new Scottish Medicines Consortium will provide
national guidance to local health boards and prescrib›
ers on whether new drugs should be adopted. It is dif›
ficult to see how this new body will be able to give
careful consideration to cost effectiveness, as distinct
from budgetary impact. It is even harder to see how
this sudden proliferation of overlapping NHS advisory
bodies in Scotland can further the cause of
transparency and efficiency in resource allocation.
NICE mess
In England and Wales, NICE produces national
guidance on individual technologies (“appraisals”), the
management of specific conditions (“clinical guide›
lines”), and clinical audit.6 The purpose of this
guidance is to assist health professionals in providing
NHS patients with the highest attainable level of care.
In pursuing this goal NICE must ensure that its advice
is based on rigorous analysis and assessment of all the
available evidence and encompasses both clinical
effectiveness and cost effectiveness.7
In pursuing this ambitious agenda, NICE has an
inadequate budget and, until recently, a less than
transparent evaluation process. Thus the eventual
decision of NICE to support the use of zanamivir in the
NHS was based on evidence that was not available to
outsiders until three weeks after the decision was
announced. Consequently, many people were dubious
about the scientific basis of this decision and some have
subsequently over›ridden it.8 Similar concerns have
been expressed about some other decisions (for
example, on taxanes) and delayed decision making (for
example, about interferon beta for multiple sclerosis) by
NICE.9 10 Since April 2001 all evidence has had to be
open, and this welcome change will aid transparency.
However, the continued and protracted lobbying of
NICE by patients’ organisations and industry bodies
generates fears that decisions can and will continue to be
delayed by mechanisms other than the evidence base.
These are not the only problems with NICE. The
decisions of NICE are not mandatory but advisory: the
chairman of NICE, Sir Michael Rawlins, has declared
their purpose to be to give “guidance” to profession›
als.11 Legally, guidance cannot be mandatory: the 1948
and subsequent NHS acts stipulate that the NHS
cannot require individual clinicians to practise
medicine in any particular way. However, the NHS
tends to react as if advice from NICE were mandatory,
as do the media. One exception to this has been a
group of general practitioners in north Devon who
robustly rejected NICE’s advice on zanamivir.12
NICE has concluded that all of the new
pharmaceuticals it has appraised are cost effective and
has refused to rank them in any form of hierarchy—not
even a grading of “high,” “medium,” or “low” cost effec›
tiveness, let alone a full scale league table. As a
consequence, health authorities are slavishly funding
marginally cost effective drugs approved by NICE and
diverting funding away from more cost effective
existing services that lack politically powerful advocates
(for example, hip replacements and cataract surgery).
NICE has effectively become an advocacy mechanism
by which lobbies of specialists and their supporters in
the pharmaceutical industry extract more public
money from the NHS. Instead of challenging the phar›
maceutical industry to show value for money, NICE
has become their “golden goose.”
There are also concerns about equity. NICE places
heavy emphasis on reducing “postcode prescribing” of
interventions.13 With fixed budgets, however, NICE
guidance that is adopted will be funded by cutting (or
by diluting, delaying, deterring, or deflecting) other
services. Local decisions about such cuts will vary. As a
consequence, geographical variations in quality of care
may actually increase for those less fortunate services
bereft of attention from NICE. Worse, the focus on
postcode prescribing may divert attention from other
goals relating to equity. For example, individual
patients from the professional classes may prove
particularly adept at insisting that NICE guidance is
followed in their particular cases. This might exacer›
bate inequalities in access to high quality health care.
The way forward
To remedy these problems, NICE needs to become a
national healthcare rationing agency, and SIGN and the
other Scottish agencies should complement this activity.
Firstly, NICE needs to start saying “no” to costly and
relatively cost ineffective new drugs and devices. Ration›
ing of new technologies is essential for political as well as
economic reasons. Without politically acceptable ways of
doing this, technology will continue to fuel the widening
gap between public expectations and public willingness
to pay for the NHS. The wider this gap grows the greater
the risk that wealthier patients will turn to the private
sector for their core health services, leading ultimately to
the NHS becoming a rump service used only by the
poor and the unhealthy.
To ensure consistency in decisions on rationing
made by NICE, a fixed growth budget for new
technologies might be implemented (over, say, a three
year cycle), within which NICE must prioritise its guid›
ance. This could be distributed to health authorities
and primary care trusts in proportion to the estimated
net costs of the new technologies, and could cover all
NHS and associated social care costs for each technol›
SU
E
SH
AR
PL
ES
Education and debate
744 BMJ VOLUME 323 29 SEPTEMBER 2001 bmj.com
ogy over a particular time period. It could also account
for savings resulting from guidance on stopping the
use of established technologies, giving NICE an incen›
tive to identify disinvestment opportunities (for exam›
ple, induction of labour using vaginal gel rather than
cheaper but equally effective vaginal tablets14). To
preserve incentives for realistic estimation of net costs,
local bodies could be allowed to demand further cash
from NICE if they can show after the event that the
original estimates by NICE were too low.
A second change would be for NICE to be given
the option of concluding that definite national
guidance is inappropriate for some technologies, if
reducing postcode prescribing would compromise
other goals relating to equity or efficiency. A case in
point might be interferon beta for multiple sclerosis—
positive guidance might not be cost effective (yielding
modest benefits to a relatively small number of
patients at a high total cost), but negative guidance
might compromise the NHS principle of seeking to
do as much as possible for seriously ill patients. Leav›
ing funding decisions to local discretion might be the
best option.
As an aid to decision making, NICE should publish
information on cost effectiveness in a format that
makes it readily comparable across appraised tech›
nologies, including league tables of incremental cost
effectiveness whenever possible. Such tables might
provide information on cost effectiveness for different
subgroups of the population, differentiate between
local and overseas data, and grade the quality of these
data on the basis of compliance with guidance on
methods published by NICE.15
A final proposal is to develop price›performance
contracts, which would allow costly new technologies
to be funded on condition that the future price is
linked to the performance of the product in further
industry sponsored clinical trials or observational stud›
ies of the technology in routine use. Evidence of
improved cost effectiveness might lead to higher prod›
uct prices and vice versa. If such binding price›
performance agreements could be implemented, this
would reduce the political pressure on NICE to give an
unconditional acceptance at the launch of a product,
before good information about cost effectiveness
becomes available. Contracting would ensure that, if
new data show that actual cost effectiveness differs
from that promised at launch, companies would have
to adjust the price to maintain the promised level of
cost effectiveness.
Conclusion
There seems to be little appreciation of the economic
issues surrounding both the wrong SIGN and the
NICE mess. Such issues are complicated by the impre›
cise knowledge base for informing analysis of clinical
effectiveness and cost effectiveness, the comparative
advantage of the healthcare industry in “creatively cul›
tivating” or biasing trial results, and the difficulty of
incorporating equity factors into explicit and evidence
based methods of assessing health technology.
Without doubt it is wise to invest in health technol›
ogy assessment in a complementary manner within the
United Kingdom. Appropriate orientation in terms of
transparency and efficiency of resource allocation
seems less than complete: neither SIGN nor NICE is
performing its function of informing “hard choices”
about the rationing of scarce healthcare resources.16 As
protagonists vie for shares of this new “healthcare
feast,” the concern must be that the direction of these
organisations is muddled and not likely to ensure effi›
cient and equitable use of society’s scarce resources.
This muddle is, in part, the responsibility of naive and
over ambitious politicians who promise more than can
reasonably be delivered; it is also partly the
responsibility of practitioners in these organisations.
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Endpiece
Beyond the blame culture?
You cannot separate the just from the unjust and
the good from the wicked;
For they stand together before the face of the sun
even as the black thread and the white are woven
together.
And when the black thread breaks, the weaver shall
look into the whole cloth and he shall examine the
loom also.
The Prophet, Kahlil Gibran
(a Lebanese poet), 1923
Submitted by James Stewart,
retired consultant physician, Cheltenham
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